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Abstract: Herein I argue that Amie Thomasson’s account of public artifacts is empirically 
vulnerable. I first identify the descriptive claims that feature in Thomasson’s argument and then 
outline an experimental framework in which the accuracy of those claims can be evaluated. I 
conclude with some brief remarks on the possible implications of my approach for Thomasson’s 
account, and some thoughts on whether an experimental approach to evaluating projects in 
descriptive metaphysics might be valuable more broadly.
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 Introduction 
Herein I argue that Amie Thomasson’s account of public artifacts is empirically vulnerable. I 
first identify the descriptive claims that feature in Thomasson’s argument and then outline an 
experimental framework in which the accuracy of those claims can be evaluated. I conclude with 
some brief remarks on the possible implications of my approach for Thomasson’s account, and 
some thoughts on whether an experimental approach to evaluating projects in descriptive 
metaphysics might be valuable more broadly.  
In Public Artifacts, Intentions, and Norms1 Amie Thomasson puts forth a descriptive 
account of our conception of artifacts based on our practices surrounding them in everyday life. 
Thomasson argues that these practices reveal that we conceive of artifacts as “public”, or as 
inherently normative and social. She captures this conception by claiming that artifacts depend on 
public norms of regard. So, Thomasson calls these everyday artifacts “public artifacts.”2 Archetypes 
of public artifacts include chairs, socks, salad forks and cars inter alia. Notably, her focus is not on 
the philosopher or contrastive folk exclusively. Thomasson is interested in the public interaction 
with artifacts such that “we”, “our”, and “folk” almost always refer to philosophers and non-
philosophers alike. The relevant artifact practices concern our interactions with artifacts on a daily 
basis in a largely non-philosophical manner. E.g., imagine putting on socks, filling up your car with 
gas, and eating salad with a salad fork at a nice dinner; not whether the ship of Theseus is a space-
time worm, or whether Lumpl and the statue are identical or just really close friends.  
Thomasson’s descriptive account aims to capture the significance of artifacts in our lives. 
Artifacts’ significance derives partially from their dependence on norms of regard, which gives 
“normative structure” to our lives.3 These norms of regard can govern how the artifact itself is to be 
regarded, how those bearing/using the artifact are to behave, and how those bearers/users are to 
                                                          
1 See Thomasson 2014, starting on p. 45.  
2 Ibid. p. 46. 
3 See Thomasson 2016, p. 10. This paper is especially useful because it develops some ideas in Thomasson’s 
account of public artifacts further. E.g., in Thomasson 2014, p. 60, she considers the practical benefits and 
significance of our public conception of artifacts to be captured in the “web of norms” it weaves. This 
significance is helpfully expanded upon in Thomasson 2016 as including the ability to structure our lives via 
expectations. 
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be regarded by others.4 A benefit of the resultant normative structure is that it facilitates the 
formation of reliable expectations about how people will behave toward artifacts. We infer that 
such expectations are in place based on peoples’ reactions to certain behavior. For example, 
consider a public artifact like a church. If kids are darting between pews in an attempt to play hide-
and-seek during a church service, members of the congregation will scold them. One might say we 
expect better behavior in a church, even though the kids’ violations are somewhat expected. 
However, if the pastor runs underneath your legs to hide from the deacons you might either be too 
shocked to scold him or too busy reviving your grandmother. Scolding the kids also enforces the 
church norms, as much as it instills them. The pastor’s violation is more surprising because we 
expect the church norms to have been instilled in him long ago, and for him to respect them. So 
while these violations vary in their degree of predictability they both illustrate how norms help us 
form expectations about behavior. Furthermore, these norms are evaluative in the sense that they 
are enforced by social sanctions or rebuke.5 
Thomasson focuses on these kinds of social interactions between artifacts, the public and 
norms of regard. It helps to think of these norms of regard as evaluative and predictive like in the 
example above, rather than deontic. While we do enforce norms of regard they are not as strictly 
enforced as deontic norms, which might express moral imperatives or truths. Norms of regard for 
artifacts connote agreed upon ranges of acceptable behavior for the pragmatic benefit of 
structuring our lives. Perhaps it is not, in general, morally wrong that the pastor tried to play hide-
and-seek during service, but it is wrong-for-church.6  
The other central tenet in Thomasson’s account is that artifacts must be intentionally 
created. The interplay of creator intentions and norms of regard in our conception of artifacts 
                                                          
4 See Thomasson 2014, p. 53 and her example of uniforms which “impose norms on how they should be 
regarded, how the wearer of the uniform is to behave, and how those interacting with the wearer are to regard 
them.” 
5 See Thomasson 2014, p. 53-5. Also see Thomasson 2016, p. 13, for how expectations about how to act, and 
how we might be sanctioned otherwise, plausibly underlie norm compliance. 
6 These evaluative norms of regard are neither as universal nor as heavily enforced as deontic norms like “one 
should not murder.” This is plausibly due to the comparatively low cost of having a failed expectation for how 
people will act in church versus the high cost for wrongly predicting that a hooded figure in a parking garage 
will not kill you. These evaluative norms may also not be explicitly known or promulgated, perhaps primarily 
being internalized. As such, a primary resource to infer that an evaluative norm is in place is people’s behavior.  
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reveals a further social phenomenon. Thomasson calls this phenomenon the ‘general coincidence 
of intended and actual regard’ for some public artifact. 7 This coincidence expresses a specific 
relationship between artifacts, the public and the creator-intended norms of regard. Thomasson 
recognizes the significance of this coincidence and suggests that her account can explain it. 
Furthermore, she explicitly considers her account to solve cases of exaptation.8 I argue that 
Thomasson’s account should be able to explain coincidence and solve cases of exaptation. I also 
argue that what I call the “inferred norm” is the tool she needs to do both.9 However, Thomasson 
only implies that the inferred norm is in place, or is a part of our conception of public artifacts.10 I 
argue that she relies on it and that without the inferred norm Thomasson will leave an explanatory 
gap in her account.11 Luckily, we can test for the presence of the inferred norm, or so I argue. In the 
next section I elucidate how the norms of regard and creator intentions feature in Thomasson’s 
account. Then I explain why coincidence and exaptation are phenomena that Thomasson should be 
able to capture and why she relies on the inferred norm to do so.  
 
 Section :1  Norms of regard, creator intentions, coincidence and exaptation 
 Section 1.1: The dependence of public artifacts on norms of regard 
What does it mean to say that artifacts depend on norms of regard? Thomasson looks to 
language in order to understand what a public artifact, like a church, is. The rules of use for the 
term “church”, or the conditions in which the term is used, largely determine and reveal what it is 
to be a church. These rules of use define the “application conditions” for an artifact term, or when 
the term applies to some object. These application conditions reveal what our conception of 
                                                          
7 See Thomasson 2014. p. 53. I often refer to this as merely “coincidence” for simplicity. 
8 Exaptation concerns successfully created artifacts that are regarded by norms other than those intended. Ibid. 
9 The inferred norm says that artifacts are to be regarded as intended by their creators. I focus on this in 
section two. 
10 See Thomasson 2014, p. 53, where she states that the inferred norm explains coincidence. This can even be 
read hypothetically as: the inferred norm would explain coincidence if it were in place. I also argue that she 
uses the inferred norm to reach her intuitive solution to her thought experiment on exaptation. I consider 
Thomasson reliant on the inferred norm to do substantial explanatory work regardless of whether this reliance 
is explicit or not. 
11 This is not to say that Thomasson cannot find another norm to fill the gap. Rather, the inferred norm is only 
candidate that Thomasson identifies and it does the relevant explanatory work very well.  
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artifacts consists in. Thomasson argues that such application conditions reveal that we make use of 
an inherently normative conception of artifacts. Namely, we consider artifacts, and the surrounding 
practices, to be bound by norms of regard. So, to be a public artifact is to be intentionally created 
as subject to some norms of regard. Without these norms in place, public artifacts would not 
exist.12   
Artifacts can even be distinguished from one another according to the norms of regard they 
are governed by. E.g., salad forks are to be used in dinner parties, to eat salad with, while holding 
them at an angle between your middle and ring finger, etc. Plastic forks are to be used in cafeterias 
or sack lunches, to eat basically any food with, and to be held casually. To refer to some artifact as a 
salad fork is to claim that it was intentionally created as to be regarded by salad fork norms.13 So, 
the dependence of artifacts on norms of regard expresses our conception of artifacts on both an 
abstract level, as inherently normative objects, and on a concrete level as objects distinguishable by 
the particular norms of regard they are governed by. This ability for norms of regard to distinguish 
between artifacts further structures our lives by bolstering the ability to form reliable expectations 
about artifact behavior. 
Although these evaluative norms of regard are less stringent than deontic norms they also 
need to be distinguished from mere regularities.  Thomasson considers a mere regularity nothing 
more than a “descriptive statement about what people happen to do.”14 Regularities describe what 
happens whereas norms might also explain why something happens or predict whether it will 
happen. So, it is important that artifact behaviors are normative, rather than merely regular, so that 
we can structure our lives with greater precision. To see this, take some behavior plausibly ranged 
over by a norm and change it into a regularity by removing any social sanctions or rebuke against 
misbehavior. E.g., imagine that driving slowly in the leftmost lane of traffic is no longer governed by 
rebuke like honking or ‘waving’ (the bird). We can imagine that the result might be more people 
                                                          
12 Here Thomasson takes her well known deflationary stance which ties semantic rules of use for “refer” to the 
rules of use for “exists” inter alia. I cannot do her general ontological stance any more justice here, but see 
Thomasson 2007 and 2015 for the most robust treatments. See Thomasson 2008 and 2009 for shorter papers 
which sum up her stance nicely. 
13 See Thomasson 2014, pp. 52-3.  
14 So these norms of regard are understood as “genuine norms”, not mere regularities. Ibid p. 53. 
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sauntering along in the left lane. Letting slowpokes, like myself, do whatever they please is likely to 
ruin the flow of traffic. This may cause wrecks and traffic jams because we will be less likely to 
reliably predict the traffic conditions. 15 
So, Thomasson is committed to the idea that the behavior constitutive of our artifact 
practices, like the classification or regard of some artifact, is normative and not merely regular. If 
such behavior were merely regular it would run contrary to our conception of artifacts as 
normative. For, our conception of artifacts is derived from our practices surrounding them and is 
then used to explain such practices. If Thomasson’s derivative conception of artifacts fails to explain 
the behavior is was derived from, or the behavior it applies to, such is evidence that the conception 
is inaccurate to say of the folk. This is like checking the solution to a math problem by inputting the 
solved variable’s value back into the equation to see if it balances. So, how do creator intentions 
play into the mix? 
 
 Section 1.2: The necessity of creator intentions  
Thomasson considers it a conceptual truth that all artifacts are the products of intentional 
creation and this truth features in her account of public artifacts.16 Creators cannot merely will 
artifacts into existence though, they must attain some degree of success. Thomasson uses the idea 
of “intentional recognizability” to capture the success conditions for creator intentions when 
making public artifacts. 17 Namely, when a creator intends to make a public artifact they must have 
a description of the artifact in mind. This description contains some perceptible or structural 
features of the artifact and the norms of regard that artifacts like that are to subject to. Then, the 
creator intentionally brings about those perceptible or structural features to make the artifact 
capable of being recognized as subject to those norms of regard. So, what makes an intention to 
                                                          
15 Most states only have laws that require “slow” vehicles to stay to the right. The discretion is almost solely left 
to the motorist to determine whether they are driving slowly. So, it is plausible that primarily social norms 
influence the standing rule: slowpokes keep right. See http://www.mit.edu/~jfc/right.html.   
16 See Thomasson 2014, p. 46. 
17 Ibid. p. 50. 
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create a public artifact successful is that the artifact be ‘recognizable as subject to certain norms of 
regard’.18 
The intentional recognizability of public artifacts functions like a form of communication 
between a creator and some agent. Here Thomasson follows Randall Dipert in claiming that 
artifacts are inherently social and serve the purpose of communicating a creator’s intention by 
prompting a belief in some agent. For public artifacts, this belief is about how the creator intends 
the artifact to be regarded. The actual features of an artifact communicate this message from 
creator to agent. So, for an artifact to be recognizable as subject to certain norms of regard is for 
the artifact to likely prompt a belief in some agent about how the creator intends the artifact to be 
regarded. Prompting this belief ultimately depends upon the existence of those public norms of 
regard. Without those public norms of regard in place, creators could not successfully communicate 
to agents because there would be no stable way to associate artifacts to certain intended regard.  
For example, imagine you intend to create a rocking chair. To have a successful intention 
your rocking chair should resemble whichever rocking chairs are subject to the norms of regard that 
you wish your rocking chair to be subject to. If your intention is successful you will have created a 
rocking chair that is recognizable as subject to at least your intended norms of regard. This is 
because your rocking chair resembles other rocking chairs also governed by those norms of regard.  
Furthermore, if your rocking chair is recognizable, there is a good chance it will actually be 
recognized, or will prompt a belief in some agent that corresponds to how you intend your rocking 
chair to be regarded. If it is recognized as intended, there is a good chance it will actually be 
regarded via the intended rocking chair norms. This connection expresses the coincidence of 
intended and actual regard. Thomasson recognizes the significance of this coincidence and the 
value of capturing it. 19 It is also a fact of the matter that she thinks the inferred norm is what will 
                                                          
18 Ibid. 
19 See Thomasson, p. 53. Thomasson does not explicitly state that this coincidence is a significant feature of our 
conception of artifacts. However, she clearly does consider coincidence significant and as something worth 
capturing. This is evidenced by her flagging it and considering the inferred norm to explain it. She also considers 
it a virtue of her account that she explains cases of exaptation, which are special cases of the failure for 
intended and actual regard to coincide. 
Davenport 9 
 
capture, or explain, this coincidence.20 Beyond that, Thomasson claims that her account solves 
cases of exaptation. I argue that Thomasson flags these phenomena because she needs to be able 
to account for both of them.  
 
 Section 1.3: Two important phenomena: the coincidence of intended and 
actual regard and cases of exaptation 
Coincidence and exaptation are important phenomena for Thomasson because they display 
how her theory of public artifacts works in its full capacity, with norms of regard and creator 
intentions featuring prominently. 21 However, Thomasson does not explicitly state why she 
considers coincidence significant and so I start by explaining why she might. Since Thomasson 
explicitly aims to solve cases of exaptation, considers it a virtue of her account that she can do so, 
and cases of exaptation have been dealt with perennially by artifact theorists, I do not have to 
motivate the significance of exaptation too much. However, I do explain how coincidence and 
exaptation are intimately connected and why this connection makes Thomasson’s reliance on the 
inferred norm more salient.  
The main reason why I think might Thomasson consider the coincidence of intended and 
actual regard significant is because it captures the most robust sense of creator success and 
plausibly motivates the creation of artifacts in the first place. To see this, imagine your rocking chair 
again. According to Thomasson’s account, you succeed in creating your rocking chair if it is 
recognizable as subject to at least the rocking chair norms you intend. Like I said above, it may then 
be likely that your rocking chair actually gets recognized and regarded in the way in which you 
intended it to. When it actually gets recognized and regarded accordingly, this seems to capture a 
more robust sense of creator success than mere recognizability. Namely, the prospect of actual 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 
21 Recall that the significance of artifacts lies in the normative structure they give our lives. When evaluating 
the significance of explaining coincidence and solving exaptation, it is helpful to think of how doing so would 
help to structure our lives. Explaining coincidence plausibly secures the motivation to create a public artifact by 
giving creators (and agents) more reliable expectations as to how the resultant artifact will be regarded. Solving 
exaptation carries a similar benefit: it enables us to predict how people will classify artifacts in especially tricky 
cases, which bears on how we classify artifacts in general. 
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recognition and regard are likely what motivated you to create the rocking chair in the first place. 
You created the rocking chair so it would be sat it in! 
Here the question might be why Thomasson does not account for coincidence in the 
obvious way, by including actual recognition and regard in her success conditions for creator 
intentions. Thomasson gives a clear answer here. She does not do such because seemingly arbitrary 
circumstances could produce counter-intuitive results. E.g., imagine your rocking chair that is 
perfectly recognizable as subject to the norms you intend it to be subject to. Also imagine that you 
locked your rocking chair in your workshop permanently and that it will never be recognized or 
regarded in the way in which you intended. In this case, if actual recognition and regard are 
components of your intention, then your intention fails and the rocking chair fails to exist as such. 
But, there is an obvious sense in which you did create a rocking chair; namely, it is perfectly 
recognizable as a rocking chair and if someone broke into your workshop it will probably be 
recognized as such (ceteris paribus). Due to cases like this, Thomasson opts to exclude actual 
recognition and regard from the success conditions for creator intentions.22 
Nevertheless, I think Thomasson considers coincidence important because it represents the 
motivating force to create public artifacts. It is plausible that we create public artifacts precisely 
because we want them to actually be recognized and regarded in intended ways. Coincidence 
secures creator motivation and captures the most robust sense of successful communication from a 
creator to an agent, which connotes the social component of our public conception of artifacts.  
However, in some cases the recognizability of an artifact is as likely to prompt a belief in 
some agent that the artifact is to be subjected to norms of regard (A) as it is to some other norms 
of regard (B). These cases occur especially when distinct artifact kinds have similar structural or 
perceptible features. In cases like this, the creator intention is still successful; namely, the artifact is 
recognizable as subject to the intended norms of regard (A). But, the artifact is also recognizable as 
                                                          
22 However, this need not mean that creators fail to intend for their artifacts to actually be recognized and 
regarded in certain ways. These may be the components of another intention the creator has, other than the 
literal intention to create a public artifact. If this is right to say of Thomasson then it explains how she can 
afford to exclude actual recognition and regard from her success conditions on creator intentions, while still 
considering such coincidence an important social phenomenon to capture.  
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subject to other norms of regard (B). When an artifact is successfully created like this but is 
regarded by non-intended norms (B), coincidence fails to occur. The failure of coincidence in this 
way is what marks a case of exaptation. 23 If creators are motivated by the prospect of their 
intended regard coinciding with actual regard, then exaptation represents a threat to this 
motivation. So, it is important to solve or explain cases of exaptation in a way that preserves this 
coincidence between intended and actual regard, such that the motivation to create an artifact can 
be preserved. 24 Even without this threat to creator motivation though, cases of exaptation pose 
difficult questions that any theory of artifacts should answer to; namely: what plays the lead role in 
the classification of an artifact? Is it the actual regard an artifact is subject to, or the regard an 
artifact is intended to be subject to? 
So Thomasson has independent reasons to solve cases of exaptation. But, exaptation and 
the coincidence of intended and actual regard are closely related phenomena. They are so closely 
related that a solution to cases of exaptation plausibly explains the general coincidence between 
intended and actual regard for public artifacts. Conversely, an explanation of such coincidence also 
predicts how people will classify exapted artifacts. So, Thomasson explicitly aims to solve 
exaptation and at least implicitly aims to explain coincidence as well. However she accomplishes 
these tasks will have to wield our putative conception of artifacts and preserve the role of norms of 
regard and creator intentions. Furthermore, the connection between coincidence and exaptation 
alludes to a single normative explanation working for both. Looking to the available ways she could 
solve cases of exaptation makes this connection clearer. 
There are two ways we could classify exapted artifacts: 1) by the actual norms of regard 
they are subjected to, or 2) the norms of regard they were intended to be subject to. I argue that 
Thomasson relies on it being the case that we classify artifacts according to their intended regard, 
                                                          
23 I deal with Thomasson’s thought experiment on exaptation in the next section. The main point here is the 
connection between exaptation and coincidence. 
24 Furthermore, there is nothing about our conception of artifacts so far that secures this coincidence. Namely, 
just because some agent believes that an artifact was intentionally created for some purpose or regard does 
not give a normative explanation for why the agent would go ahead and regard it accordingly. Why should the 
creator’s intention matter here? Even holding creator success conditions relative to an intended audience does 
not do the trick, especially when intended audiences might have more than one set of norms capable of 
ranging over some artifact.  
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and that we do so because of the inferred norm. Namely, if we classify artifacts according to their 
actual regard, rather than their intended regard, then, prima facie, we are not holding the 
intentions of the creator significant in such classificatory practices. For, the intentions of the creator 
could have been different than they were and it would have made no difference to how we 
classified the exapted artifact (so long as it was still regarded in the same way). Furthermore, if the 
actual norms of regard an artifact is subjected to grounds its classification, then there is a plausible 
case to be made that we do not consider artifacts to be intentionally created. Namely, if the creator 
intention does not weigh more than the actual norms of regard an artifact is subjected to, then 
what is to stop us from claiming that non-intentional objects that are subjected to norms of regard 
are also artifacts? If we do not classify artifacts according to their intended regard, then what 
reason do we have to consider whether the artifact was intentionally created? Specifically, there 
does not seem to be a reason that hinges on our normative conception of artifacts. This might cast 
doubt on the descriptive accuracy of the conceptual truth that artifacts are intentionally created. 
For, our normative conception of artifacts, which supposedly holds intentional creation as essential, 
would not explain such classificatory practices. At any rate, the classification of exapted artifacts 
according to the actual norms of regard they are subjected to is not conducive to creator intentions 
being a central tenet in our conceptions of artifacts. Or, as a weaker claim, the classification of 
exapted artifacts via their intended regard is much more conducive to the central tenets of 
Thomasson’s account.  
If we classify exapted artifacts according to their intended norms of regard, then this 
classificatory practice would evidence our conception of artifacts as packaging creator intention 
and norms of regard into one significant bundle. Even though the creator intention would weigh 
more in the classification of an exapted artifact than the actual norms of regard it is subjected to, 
the creator intention would weigh more partly because of the norms of regard which the creator 
intended to govern the artifact. In this case, by respecting creator intentions, we are also respecting 
the actual norms of regard which would have had to have been in place in order for the creator’s 
intention to have been successful in the first place. So, by classifying exapted artifacts via their 
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intended regard we are exhibiting a conception of artifacts which holds norms of regard and 
creator intentions primary.  
Finally, if our classification of exapted artifacts, or our intuitions about such, sides with 
intended regard, then it is likely that such a corresponding conception of artifacts will explain the 
coincidence of intended and actual regard as well. Namely, if we think that artifacts are to be 
classified according to the norms of regard that a creator intended them to be subject to, then we 
might also think artifacts are to be treated according to those intended norms of regard. Concisely, 
it is likely that we think artifacts are to be regarded according to how we classify them. On the 
converse, a normative explanation for why intended regard generally coincides with actual regard 
for public artifacts would also govern, or predict, our classificatory behavior surrounding exapted 
artifacts. Namely, if we think that artifacts are to be regarded as they are intended to be regarded, 
then we might also think that artifacts are to be classified according to their intended regard.   
So what kind of normative explanation could Thomasson give that would handle both 
coincidence and exaptation? Well, Thomasson is going to want to claim that our normative 
conception of artifacts is what explains our classification of exapted artifacts and the general 
coincidence of intended and actual regard. But, in order for Thomasson give such an explanation of 
these phenomena, there has to be a norm in place which ranges over them. The only norm that 
Thomasson identifies as capable is the inferred norm. The inferred norm says that artifacts are to 
be regarded as their creator intended them to be regarded. The applicability of the inferred norm 
to Thomasson’s account is clear. It not only specifically addresses coincidence, as Thomasson 
explicitly states, it also addresses exaptation. Namely, the connection between exaptation and 
coincidence suggests that a norm which ranges over coincidence plausibly ranges over exaptation, 
and vice versa. So, the inferred norm can solves cases of exaptation and explain the general 
coincidence of intended and actual regard in one fell swoop. 
Even though the application of the inferred norm to Thomasson’s account is fairly clear, 
Thomasson’s relationship with it is a bit slippery. She does not tell us how it will explain 
coincidence, even though she claims such. She also does not make explicit how, or whether, she 
uses it to solve her thought experiment on exaptation. So, making these applications clear is my 
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aim in the next section. Seeing how the inferred norm is poised to do such tidy explanatory work 
for Thomasson helps show that she is committed to it. Even if she is only committed implicitly or 
hypothetically, it is clear that the inferred norm is something Thomasson’s account relies on in 
order to explain coincidence and solve her case of exaptation. I close the section by elucidating how 
the inferred norm bears the empirical vulnerability of Thomasson’s account.  
 
 Section 2: The inferred norm 
I argue that Thomasson needs the inferred norm to be accurately said of the folk so that 
she can handle coincidence and exaptation in a way which utilizes our putatively public conception 
of artifacts. Otherwise, Thomasson would either have to inaccurately posit the inferred norm 
amongst the folk or fail to be able to explain coincidence and solve exaptation. Furthermore, 
coincidence and exaptation are exactly the kind of phenomena that Thomasson’s account should 
explain.25 Namely, these phenomena concern the exact kind of behavior Thomasson claims to 
range over: the interplay of norms of regard and creator intentions. So, just how is the inferred 
norm poised to do such tidy explanatory work in Thomasson’s account?  
First a bit on the inferred norm. The inferred norm says: ‘artifacts are to be treated as their 
creator intended them to be treated.’26 Notice that agents cannot be required to know the actual 
intentions of some creator for their behavior to be governed by the inferred norm. When we 
recognize some public artifact as intended to be regarded in some way, we are only able to 
confidently believe that a creator intended the artifact to be governed by certain norms of regard. 
So, the inferred norm is not applying to the actual intention of the creator, from the believer’s 
point of view. To say that we are to regard artifacts the way in which they are intended to be 
regarded is really saying that we are to regard artifacts the way which respects our most confident 
belief for what norms of regard the creator intended the artifact to be governed by.  
                                                          
25 This is not to say Thomasson couldn’t go another route, but that she does not offer one. Furthermore, the 
inferred norm does the relevant explanatory work very well, so it is not clear why she would go another route 
anyway. 
26 The actual quote says: “We can perhaps uncover a deeper norm regarding treatment of all artifacts: that 
artifacts are (prima facie) to be treated as their creator intends them to be treated.” Emphasis original. Ibid. p. 
53. 
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Furthermore, I think the inferred norm is most clearly read as stating that artifacts are only 
to be regarded according to our most confident belief for how the creator intended them to be 
regarded (ceteris paribus). Since this intended regard can specify how the artifact is to be used, in 
what ways, by whom etc. -- there is a sense in which it is only to be used or treated like that.27  
 
 Section 2.1: How the inferred norm explains coincidence  
If the inferred norm were a part of our conception of artifacts then it would explain the 
general coincidence of intended and actual regard. Imagine that some agent recognizes an artifact 
as intended to be subject to certain norms of regard. Further imagine that the creator’s intention 
was successful and the agent’s belief accurately corresponds to the intended regard of the artifact. 
Assuming the inferred norm is a part of our conception of artifacts, we will then regard the artifact 
according to that belief, and so, coincidence occurs.28 Thomasson needs to invoke the inferred 
norm to do this explanatory work because she considers our conception of artifacts as inherently 
normative; or as characterizes by genuine norms, not explanatorily inadequate regularities. 
Furthermore, because the inferred norm ranges over our most confident belief, we can change how 
we regard the artifact as new evidence rolls in for how the creator intended the artifact to be 
regarded. This continuous tracking of the creator’s actual intention further shores up the likelihood 
of coincidence occurring. This tracking is also salient when looking at how the inferred norm might 
solve Thomasson’s case of exaptation. 
 
 
 
                                                          
27 Norms of regard do not have to be this specific though and can be fairly general. Furthermore, situations 
with conflicting sets of norms only preclude the inferred norm from applying when the conflict between the 
norms is overwhelming. I give an example of such an overwhelming conflict in section three. 
28 The general distinction between declarative and imperative speech acts may be helpful here. Our public 
conception of artifacts holds the behavior surrounding them as normative. So, coincidence should be explained 
normatively. If an artifact is like a declarative speech act, then the artifact merely makes the creator’s intended 
regard apparent. Even when coincidence occurs, this declarative way of thinking fails to explain such 
coincidence. Just because an artifact communicates a creator’s intentions does not explain why we respect 
those intentions. Fortunately, the inferred norm does explain exactly that. The inferred norm essentially turns 
an artifact from a declarative speech act to an imperative one, by enforcing respect of creator intentions. 
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 Section 2.2: How the inferred norm solves cases of exaptation 
Exaptation occurs when a public artifact is successfully created with the intention that it be 
recognizable as subject to one set of norms, but is in fact subjected to another. Importantly, 
Thomasson says in cases like this we classify artifacts according to their intended norms in their 
intended contexts, not the actual norms they are subjected to in their actual context. Plausibly, 
Thomasson is making this descriptive claim for two reasons: 1) she thinks that our classificatory 
practices actually do prioritize intended regard, and 2) she relies on it to being the case that we 
classify exapted artifacts according to their intended regard. For reasons discussed in section 1.3, 
if exapted artifacts were classified according to their actual regard, then Thomasson would 
struggle to capture our actual artifact practices while preserving the central tenets of her 
account. 
So, what motivates Thomasson to make such a descriptive claim? Here she uses a thought 
experiment on exaptation for which she offers an intuitive solution. Thomasson asks us to imagine 
chopstick creators from China who expect that Westerners eat like they do. They send chopsticks 
west, unaware that Westerners have hair-stick norms rather than chopstick norms.  The 
Westerners recognize the chopsticks as hair-sticks, and use them like hair-sticks, without knowing 
the intention of the Chinese creators.29 
Thomasson thinks that the clear intuition here is that these artifacts are chopsticks and not 
hair-sticks. Furthermore, she says that in cases like this it is ‘clearly the intended norms which are 
used to classify the artifacts, and not the actual norms they were subjected to’.30 Thomasson’s 
intuitive solution is supposed to corroborate her descriptive claim: actual regard does not feature, 
or feature as strongly as intended regard, in our classification of exapted artifacts. I argue that the 
inferred norm is employed within Thomasson’s thought experiment and leads to such a solution. 
One way to see the plausibility of this is to reason through her thought experiment while employing 
the inferred norm, which I do below. If the result is an intuitive solution that matches Thomasson’s, 
                                                          
29 See Thomasson 2014, pp. 53-4. 
30 Ibid. p. 54.  
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then such is evidence that the inferred norm is employed within her reasoning or the design of her 
thought experiment. 
First notice a possible framing effect. Thomasson’s discussion of the inferred norm leads 
directly to her thought experiment on exaptation. Within that discussion she states that the 
inferred norm explains coincidence, which I have shown to have an intuitive connection to 
exaptation. These factors plausibly prime the reader to reason through the thought experiment via 
the inferred norm. Will doing so lead to Thomasson’s intuitive solution?  
It is interesting first of all, that Thomasson makes the artifacts involved, hair-sticks and 
chopsticks, structurally identical. This effectively controls for the inferred norm by holding the 
relevant difference between the classificatory options to be whether we respect the intended 
regard or actual regard when classifying exapted artifacts. Thomasson reasons that the intended 
regard is clearly how we would classify the artifacts here. The inferred norm predicts exactly that 
behavior. 
Furthermore, Thomasson reasons that the Westerner’s might “dither” over how to classify 
the exapted artifacts when presented with evidence for the creator’s actual intention.31 Their 
dithering is plausibly due to either the weakening of their original belief for how the creator 
intended the artifacts to be regarded, or the resultant competition between two now conflicting 
beliefs for such. This reactive dithering shows the continual tracking of the creator’s actual 
intention that the inferred norm pushes us towards.32 On top of that, the readers know what the 
creator’s intention was. Thomasson stipulates that the creator in fact intended for the artifacts to 
be regarded as chopsticks. The reader, privy to this fact, has the most confident belief they could 
have for which regard the creator intended the artifact to be subject to. So, assuming the inferred 
norm is in place, the reader will classify the artifacts as chopsticks.  
If we reason through Thomasson’s thought experiment without thinking of the inferred 
norm, it is hard to explain why she thinks her solution is either intuitive or right. What does seem 
                                                          
31 Ibid. See her ninth footnote. 
32 Also notice that the Westerners are not rebuked or socially sanctioned. This is because they are not violating 
the inferred norm. They are behaving via their most confident belief for how the creator intended the artifact 
to be regarded.  
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clear is that the inferred norm is needed to explain coincidence and solve exaptation, and does so 
very well. For, just because we recognize that an artifact was intentionally created to be regarded 
by certain norms does not mean that we will, or explain why we do, classify or regard the artifact 
according to that belief. We might think that other factors, like the actual regard of the artifact, 
matter more for classification. The inferred norm ranges over just these situations, explaining 
coincidence and securing the classification of exapted artifacts via intended, not actual, regard. So, 
Thomasson either explicitly relies on the inferred norm to explain coincidence and reason through 
exaptation as she does, or apparently should rely on it to do such. 33 
 
 
 Section 2.3: The empirical vulnerability of the inferred norm 
At any rate, it is clear that the inferred norm being accurately said of the folk is valuable to 
Thomasson’s account because it allows her to make good on both of her overarching theoretical 
aims, namely: 1) to accurately describe our artifact practices and our conception of artifacts, and 2) 
to do so in such a way that explains artifacts’ significance in our lives, specifically regarding the 
apparent normative structure they provide. So, we can see her project as descriptive at the ground 
floor. In order to gauge the descriptive accuracy of her account she can use her derivative artifact 
conception to explain the phenomena which give rise to it. Some of the most important 
phenomena here are coincidence and how we classify exapted artifacts. If our putatively public 
conception of artifacts fails to explain or predict such phenomena, then this would indicate the 
descriptive inaccuracy of Thomasson’s account. Since the inferred norm can capture such 
phenomena, then testing for it would be especially informative. In order to test for the presence of 
the inferred norm we can test for the classificatory behavior of exapted artifacts that it predicts, 
and which Thomasson thinks clearly obtain. 
One way we can test for such behavior is by presenting people with a vignette like 
Thomasson’s thought experiment and then asking them questions like: Did the Westerner’s do 
                                                          
33 Thomasson’s reliance on the inferred norm holds especially in cases where exaptation occurs within an 
intended context. In these situations the expectations for coincidence to occur are likely to be very strong 
(ceteris paribus).  
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something wrong? Is the artifact a chopstick or a hair-stick? If you found out that the artifact was 
actually intended to be regarded as a chopstick, would you feel as if chopstick use was more 
appropriate? Such an experiment would put test subjects in a situation nearly identical to 
Thomasson’s readers. Namely, the subjects would also have the relevant knowledge that the 
Chinese creator actually intended the artifacts to be chopsticks. If the subjects side with the 
Westerners, then such is evidence that their conception of artifacts conflicts with Thomasson’s 
account. 34 Namely, they apparently would not think that exapted artifacts are to be classified via 
intended regard. If they respond in such ways, which run contrary to what the inferred norm 
predicts, then we have reason to doubt that the inferred norm is accurate to say of the folk. In that 
case, Thomasson will leave an explanatory gap between her account and phenomena like 
coincidence and exaptation. 
However, the devil is in the details for an experiment like this. There are a number of 
relevant factors which might affect the scenario in important ways or throw off the ability for the 
results to bear on peoples’ conception of artifacts. So I will discuss some of these features and how 
they might affect an experiment to test for the inferred norm. In doing so, I hope to have 
established a working experimental framework that is useful for designing such experiments.35 
 
 Section 3: An experimental framework to test Thomasson’s account 
Do we classify exapted artifacts based on the intended regard of the artifact or the actual 
regard it is subject to? While this question is testable, there are multiple features that need to be 
                                                          
34 Considering responses to vignettes to reveal intuitions or concepts is by no means an uncontroversial 
position. This claim is the subject of some central debates over whether experimental philosophy is a feasible 
enterprise. I discuss this connection to experimental philosophy in section five. Nevertheless, such responses to 
a vignette seem as likely to accurately reflect our conception of artifacts as the behavior that Thomasson 
otherwise relies on (ceteris paribus). Plus, Thomasson herself uses such responses to bolster her descriptive 
claim that we classify exapted artifacts via their intended regard. 
35 While I do not fully pitch an experiment to test for the inferred norm herein, I plan to design and conduct 
such an experiment in a follow-up project. Nevertheless, Thomasson’s thought experiment on exaptation is 
already fairly suitable to be tested and I discuss how certain features of her account might be brought out 
experiments on exaptation. 
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taken into consideration in order to design an experiment which bears on the presence of inferred 
norm.36  
 The prompted belief 
The most obvious feature that any experiment must have, if seeking to test for the inferred 
norm in cases of exaptation, is the ability to prompt a belief in an experimental test subject about 
how a creator intends for an artifact to be regarded. The inferred norm cannot be tested if the 
subject does not plausibly believe that the artifact is to be regarded in some way or another. The 
subject should also be fairly confident that their belief is accurate. It is not arbitrary that 
Thomasson gave the readers no room for doubt about the intended regard in her thought 
experiment on exaptation.  
Furthermore, the test subject’s belief should probably conflict with some stipulated belief 
of an experimentally designed agent as to how the creator intended the artifact to be regarded. 
Doing this makes it possible to ask the test subject questions about whether the agent was in the 
wrong, so to speak. Questions like that will make evaluating the normative force of the inferred 
norm relatively easy. It also might be interesting to vary how justified the designed agent is in their 
belief. For, if they do not seem to be justified in their apparent belief for how the creator intended 
the artifact to be regarded, then we might see more evidence of social rebuke by the test subjects. 
The inferred norm plausibly predicts such rebuke because of the continual tracking of the creator 
intention that it presses upon us, including the designed agent. So, making a designed agent either 
negligent in their belief formation or unreasonably stubborn in the face of counterevidence might 
help indicate whether the inferred norm is in place among the test subjects.  
 Overwhelming norms 
One feature to avoid is the presence of norms which might unintentionally override the 
normative pull of the inferred norm. For example, imagine you are appreciating the Mona Lisa at 
the Louvre. All of the sudden, a nun runs by screaming for help because her robe is on fire. You 
grab the Mona Lisa to beat the fire out of the nun’s robe to save her life. It would not be insightful 
                                                          
36 Nevertheless, however we classify exapted artifacts will plausibly bear on how we classify artifacts in general. 
This is why exaptation has been such an important phenomenon to artifact theorists. 
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at all, for the inferred norm’s sake, to ask whether you did anything wrong by using the Mona Lisa 
like such. The inferred norm fails to govern your actions because it is clearly overwhelmed by the 
moral or deontic norms at play.  
 Qualitative similarity 
A particularly interesting feature is how qualitatively similar the types of artifacts are, like in 
Thomasson’s thought experiment with chopsticks and hair-sticks. Chopsticks and hair-sticks are 
essentially qualitatively identical types of artifacts. Thomasson most likely uses this feature to 
control for the inferred norm. For, when asked to decide how the artifacts are to be classified, the 
only intuitive difference between the possible classifications is that one respects the creator 
intention, and the other respects the actual regard. This allows for the presence of the inferred 
norm to make itself apparent. 
Furthermore, because chopsticks and hair-sticks are qualitatively identical, this qualitative 
identity plausibly makes the artifacts just as useful in one normative context (chopsticks) as in the 
other (hair-sticks). I think this feature points out something interesting; namely, that the perceived 
likelihood of exaptation being pragmatically successful might affect how likely the exapting 
community is to be socially rebuked, or disagreed with, by the test subjects. I.e., we might test 
cases where the exapted artifacts are subjected to a set of norms which renders the artifacts less 
useful than they would have been by their intended norms of regard. E.g., imagine that the 
chopsticks were explicitly stipulated to have a glossy finish that made it difficult for them to stay 
put in peoples’ hair. Such a condition might make the test subjects more likely to rebuke the 
exapting community or less likely to classify the artifacts as hair-sticks. On the converse, perhaps 
exapting an artifact in a way that makes it more useful might have the opposite effect.  
 Nested norms 
Nesting one set of norms within another might also test this pragmatic feature. E.g., 
imagine an office space where coworkers routinely make works of art for one another to be 
displayed around the office. Pretty much everyone enjoys and partakes in this practice and they do 
not take kindly to people disrespecting the office artwork by throwing it away, carelessly damaging 
it, and even not displaying it, etc. I.e., imagine that there are some evaluative norms of regard in 
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this office community for how coworker art is to be regarded. Also imagine that one employee, 
Frank, takes a bunch of spare wooden wedges and spends the weekend carving intricate artistic 
designs into them. When he presents his wedges on Monday, everyone reacts accordingly; they 
appreciate his artwork and regard the wedges by displaying them around their office. On top of 
that, they even realize that Frank’s wedges have the added practical benefit of putting an end to 
the door-stopper shortage. All of the employees appreciate Frank’s wedges as art and some of 
them also use them as doorstoppers (without damaging them or otherwise violating the norms in 
place). Is there a correct way to classify artifacts here? Are Frank’s wedges being exapted? 
 Intended audiences, multiple norms and creator awareness 
The example above makes evident another feature worth considering. What difference 
does it make when the intended audience has more than one set of norms which might range over 
an artifact? All things being equal, in cases like this we might consider the likelihood for 
coincidence to occur at about 50%. This feature, if placed within Thomasson’s thought experiment, 
would mean that the Westerner’s would have had chopstick and hair-stick norms of regard. In this 
case we just might not consider the creator to be that successful because their artifact is not more 
likely to be recognizable via the intended set of norms, rather than some other set of norms. So, in 
cases like this, perhaps Thomasson’s account implies we would not consider exaptation 
inappropriate because we might effectively blame the creator for the oversight of making artifacts 
that were equally suitable to be regarded by multiple sets of norms.37 So, perhaps this suggests 
that the perceived degree of creator success positively correlates with the perceived degree of 
creator awareness when multiple norms of regard are in play, and affects when we consider the 
inferred norm to apply. 
On the converse, it might be the case that we think that such an artifact, intentionally 
created via one set of norms while the creator is also aware of other norms that equally apply to it, 
indicates something like over-success. In these cases perhaps we think that the classification of 
exapted artifacts need not hinge on intended regard because the artifact is just as well suited for 
                                                          
37 This might explain why Thomasson kept the Chinese ignorant of the Westerners and vice versa. For, if the 
Westerners had constituted the intended audience we might have had less clear, or opposite, intuitions for 
how to handle the exaptation.  
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other norms of regard.38 In this case, we may not consider the creator intention as important as 
what the artifact is capable of.  
Here we can play with the structural similarity between artifacts to further tease this 
feature out. We might expect that as types of artifacts become less and less structurally similar 
that exaptation becomes more and more likely to be rebuked (ceteris paribus). This might indicate 
that the perceived likelihood of the artifact to be recognizable by one set of norms predominantly, 
is a relevant factor in how we treat and classify artifacts.  
This is by no means considered to be an exhaustive list of the relevant features for an 
experiment that tests for the presence of the inferred norm, and I am probably overlooking some 
of the relevant features of these relevant features. Nevertheless, this section has drawn up a 
working experimental framework that can get the experimentalists up and running. The features I 
have discussed are fairly intertwined and are to be the most valuable to experimental designs that 
focus on exaptation and testing for the inferred norm. Nevertheless, they might also be valuable in 
their own right and experimented on individually.  
 
 Section 4: Implications for Thomasson’s account 
Fortunately, by explaining why the inferred norm is important to Thomasson, I have 
covered most of the specific implications that testing for the inferred norm may have for 
Thomasson’s account. Nevertheless, I will briefly discuss such implications but would then like to 
focus on the implications in the bigger picture. Doing so helps to see why my experimental 
approach to Thomasson’s account may be valuable more broadly. 
An experiment which tests for the presence of the inferred norm, or lack thereof, among 
our conception of artifacts can bear on Thomasson’s account in a few ways. If the results of such an 
experiment indicate that the inferred norm is not active in our artifact practices, then Thomasson 
will not be able to include it within her account. As I have pointed out, Thomasson is plausibly 
                                                          
38 Here an account of what we consider to be involved in creators’ intentions may be very valuable. Namely, if a 
creator foresees that it is a logical consequence that their artifact is equally recognizable via disparate norms, 
then are such consequences also intended? There is a debate within experimental philosophy which focuses on 
just this kind of question. See Adams and Steadman for a good discussion here. 
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committed to the inferred norm to explain coincidence and solve exaptation. Whether this 
commitment is explicit, implicit, or merely hypothetical, Thomasson has no other obvious options 
to capture such phenomena. So, right where her account is supposed to apply in its fullest would be 
where she would leave an explanatory gap.  
Results which indicate that the inferred norm is in place will serve to maintain Thomasson’s 
descriptive claims for how we classify (exapted) artifacts and will help to elucidate how the inferred 
norm explains coincidence. Even results from experiments testing individual features of her 
account can yield valuable insight towards its descriptive accuracy.  
I have spent much effort explaining how the inferred norm nestles within Thomasson’s 
account. Such effort has been well spent but it is important to understand the implications for 
Thomasson’s account in the bigger picture as well. 
I frequently call Thomasson’s account descriptive. I have Peter Strawson’s distinction 
between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics in mind here. Strawson said: “Descriptive 
metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary 
metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure”.39 Revisionary metaphysics values our 
actual structures of thought to the extent that they indicate where our representation of the world 
errs. Descriptive metaphysics values our actual structures of thought for what they might reveal, 
without the aim of improving them. I think it is clear that Thomasson falls into the descriptive 
metaphysical camp. 
However, Beth Preston makes a further distinction between two types of descriptive 
metaphysics: the “traditional option” and the “naturalistic social science option.” 40 I call these 
“traditional metaphysics” and “social metaphysics” respectively, and focus on the metaphysics of 
artifacts. Traditional metaphysicians might investigate our actual practices and attempt to account 
for them in theories, but typically while precluding certain ontological commitments from being 
empirically vulnerable. E.g., a traditional metaphysician might account for actual folk practices in 
their theory of artifacts. However, they might also hold firm to the reality of ‘artifact-kinds’ or the 
                                                          
39 My source for this Strawson quote is Preston, p. 154. 
40 Ibid. 
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stability of the category of ‘artifact’, regardless of what the folk artifact practices indicate. So, 
traditional metaphysics is plausibly inadequate to allow for full descriptive accuracy of our 
conception of artifacts.41 Nevertheless, Preston considers traditional metaphysics as a step in the 
right direction, away from the insularity that revisionary metaphysics enjoys from other 
disciplines.42 In order to fully account for our actual conception of artifacts, metaphysicians need to 
embrace artifacts’ inherent social nature and allow actual practices to inform ontological 
commitments. Social metaphysicians do just that. 
Social metaphysicians are willing to structure their ontological commitments to reflect 
actual artifact practices. Nevertheless, Preston thinks that in order to fully understand artifacts in 
their social environments, it is important to cooperate with other fields of expertise like biology, 
anthropology and sociology. Beyond the myriad of research projects in these disciplines that focus 
on actual folk practices, some of them even study practices legitimately surrounding artifacts. For 
example, some researchers in ethnobiology study various types of domesticates, or domesticated 
plants and animals. Namely, they… 
 
…already study the processing and use of plants and animals in foodways and medicine, 
and what is in your cooking pot or medicine bottle is clearly artifactual. Perhaps more 
pointedly, your cooking pot and medicine bottle are essential to the processing and use of 
whatever is in them, so the ethnobiologists can hardly fail to be taking artifacts into their 
purview, no matter what.43  
 
Here it seems that integration of social metaphysics into ethnobiology would be mutually 
harmonious and beneficial for understanding the role of artifacts in our lives. The social 
metaphysician has a legitimate ability to collaborate with other disciplines in this mutually 
beneficial way.  
I consider Thomasson to being doing social metaphysics for multiple reasons. She aims to 
capture the actual artifact practices in place and grounds our conception of artifacts in public 
norms of regard. These norms of regard facilitate the communication from an artifact creator to 
                                                          
41 Ibid. p. 157. 
42 Ibid. pp. 156-8. 
43 Ibid. p. 159. 
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some agent, which expresses the inherent sociality of artifacts. Beyond these clearly descriptive 
components of her account, Thomasson evens overturns a previous ontological commitment which 
held the intentional states of the creator alone as sufficient to create artifacts and categorize them 
by. Now she thinks artifacts depend on norms of regard, which means she also holds intentional 
states beyond those of the creator as essential to our conception of artifacts.44 Finally, her account 
is empirically vulnerable via the inferred norm. These features make it awfully hard to deny that 
Thomasson fits the social metaphysical bill.  
So, how does this social metaphysical perspective affect the experimental implications for 
her account and the ability for my experimental approach to be valuable more broadly? In general, 
experimental results might cause Thomasson to change her account to more accurately reflect folk 
practices, or may bolster her account as is. In either case, the results are likely to make her account 
more, or more obviously, descriptively accurate. Given the connection to other disciplines that 
social metaphysics enjoys, such accuracy will not only be valuable to Thomasson; for, the more 
accurate Thomasson’s account is the more likely it is to help explain phenomena that other 
research projects, like the ethnobiological one above, are focusing on. 
These implications for Thomasson’s account, which express how her account might apply 
more broadly, show how my experimental approach, if only vicariously, is valuable broadly as well. I 
see at least one more way in which an experimental approach to descriptive metaphysics, like 
mine, can be valuable more broadly and it is to that which I know turn.  
 
 Section 5: Descriptive metaphysics and experimental philosophy 
Experimental philosophy, henceforth “x-phi”, might benefit from my experimental 
approach to Thomasson’s descriptive metaphysical project in a few ways. Namely, my approach 
elucidates the ability of social constructionist accounts in general to integrate x-phi. To make this 
clear I first say a bit about x-phi. 
                                                          
44 See Thomasson 2014, p. 55. 
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X-phi is primarily the intersection of psychological experimentation and conceptual 
analysis.45 The purview of x-phi has typically concerned topics like morality and intentionality, and 
Joshua Knobe has conducted well-known experiments on such topics in order to better understand 
the relevant folk conceptions. Hereafter, unless explicitly stated otherwise, “folk” is understood in 
contrast to philosophers because it is a central aim of x-phi to compare folk concepts to 
philosophical concepts. This is considered to be primarily useful for informing the accuracy of 
certain philosophical theories. Knobe’s experiments are supposed to show the connection between 
folk concepts of intentionality and morality, and how they might differ from philosophical concepts 
of such.46 However, his results sparked a debate over the efficacy of x-phi that questions whether 
or not x-phi research methods can accurately bear upon folk concepts.47 One specific research 
method of x-phi that came under fire is the use of surveys to gather folk intuitions about vignettes. 
Certain critiques question whether surveys are a reliable way to get at the corresponding concepts, 
which the vignettes are supposed to range over, and whether intuitions are the right kind of results 
to try and elicit.48  
The critiques leveled against x-phi are numerous and I do not handle any of them in the 
depth they deserve because I am not interested in solving the potential problems of x-phi. 
However, in general, it is useful to see what kind of criticisms might apply to an experimental 
approach in metaphysics. Off the bat, folk intuitions might seem fairly worthless when supposed to 
inform metaphysical questions. For, metaphysicians have acquired a great deal of expertise, 
especially compared to the folk, in dealing with such esoteric and vexing topics like time, causation, 
and consciousness.49 So eliciting folk intuitions about such things is not likely to be informative, and 
the folk may even lack the requisite understanding to have intuitions about such things at all. 
Furthermore, their responses might either be predictable50 or indicative of a lack of stable concepts 
                                                          
45 See Kriegel for a good overview of the potential rationales for x-phi. 
46 See Knobe 2003 and 2004. 
47 See especially Adams & Steadman, p. 173. 
48 See Huebner who argues for the tendency of vignettes and thought experiments to distort intuitions. 
49 See Rose & Schaffer for discussion. They go on to reject the coherency of this expertise position. 
50 See Dunaway et al. for this critique of the utility of x-phi for philosophy.  
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altogether51, making such research relatively futile. For, if we can already predict what the folk will 
say, or if they fail to have a corresponding conception in mind, then comparing their conception to 
our own is likely to lack insight. 
While I am not interested in solving such problems here, I am interested in how an 
experimental approach to descriptive metaphysics might nevertheless benefit x-phi. Namely, while 
x-phi has been employed to investigate folk conceptions of morality and intentionality quite 
broadly, there has been little integration of x-phi within descriptive metaphysics.52 I think that there 
are prima facie reasons for why an experimental approach, like mine, to a descriptive metaphysical 
account, like Thomasson’s, might evade some of the critiques pressed against experimental 
approaches to metaphysics in general. Namely, Thomasson is focusing on artifacts, which are 
robustly social and normative. These features tie the behavior surrounding artifacts to what it is to 
be an artifact. Namely, these behaviors evidence our conception of artifacts (now in the inclusive 
sense of “our” or “folk”). These constitutive behaviors can include references to artifacts, 
classifications of artifacts and the actual regard of artifacts.  
Furthermore, I have argued that Thomasson’s account is the kind of descriptive 
metaphysics I refer to as “social metaphysics.” This identifies Thomasson’s theoretical methodology 
as willing to inform ontological commitments based upon actual folk artifact practices in place. This 
metaphysical methodology is plausibly shared by other fields of study, which also focus on folk 
practices in order to understand how they relate to various social constructs and our conceptions of 
them. Examples of such social constructs include artifacts, gender, race, and those ethnobiological 
domesticates referenced above (inter alia). For these fields of study, the relevant constructs depend 
upon folk conceptions, intentions, thoughts, intuitions, or what have you. These social constructs 
are created through social interactions, sometimes intentionally, and plausibly structure our 
everyday lives. So, rather than be insulated from what the folk think, understanding a social 
                                                          
51 See Huebner and Bernstein for discussion here.  
52 Although there has been some integration generally. Bernstein investigates the folk-concept of causation. 
See Rose & Schaffer for a study of how the folk concept of teleology affects their intuitions about composition; 
and see Korman & Carmichael for a response. 
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construct like artifacts depends upon understanding what the folk think and preserving/respecting 
it.  
So, when looked at from this descriptive metaphysical perspective, an experimental 
approach seems conducive to accuracy and value, rather than potentially devoid of such. This 
descriptive metaphysical perspective is understood as a form of social constructionism. Since other 
social constructionist accounts also focus on socially constructed entities like artifacts, the role for 
x-phi need not be limited to something like my experimental approach to Thomasson’s account and 
may apply more broadly. I am not suggesting that we let x-phi off the hook from responding to the 
critiques pressed against it, especially in regards to metaphysics. Rather, I am suggesting that social 
constructionist accounts, and specifically descriptive metaphysical ones, might be a useful platform 
to structure such responses from. 
 
 Conclusion  
In conclusion, I have argued that Amie Thomasson’s descriptive account of public artifacts, 
and our conception of them as inherently normative and social, is empirically vulnerable. I placed 
this vulnerability on the inferred norm, which I have argued is relied upon by Thomasson to account 
for such relevant phenomena like the coincidence of intended and actual regard for public artifacts 
and the way in which we classify exapted artifacts. These phenomena are just the kind of 
phenomena Thomasson’s account should be able to handle and the inferred norm allows her to do 
so. I then sketched an experimental framework that discussed relevant features for experiments 
testing for the inferred norm. The experimental implications center on making Thomasson’s 
account more descriptively accurate. Such an experimental approach builds on the ability of 
Thomasson’s account to feature in interdisciplinary discourse and exemplifies Beth Preston’s 
naturalistic social science option for descriptive metaphysics. Finally, I showed how such an 
experimental approach to descriptive metaphysics might indicate the value of integrating 
experimental philosophy into other social constructionist accounts more broadly. In all, Thomasson 
is as likely as anyone to appreciate the work done herein, since she is concerned with accurately 
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capturing our conception of artifacts. As such, the empirical vulnerability of her account is a 
principally good thing.53 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
53 Special thanks to Billy Dunaway, Jon McGinnis and Lauren Olin for helpful comments and feedback on earlier 
drafts. 
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